Every sudo command grants root.
Without verified remote logging, you have no tamper-proof record
of what actually happened — or if it happened at all.
Traditional syslog is advisory. The admin can stop the logger, the log server can be unreachable, or the service can simply be killed. None of these edge cases should allow privileged execution to go unrecorded.
sudo runs →
the command is blocked before execution.
No server, no sudo.
INCOMPLETE marker and logs a SECURITY: warning. The replay UI flags the session with a red border and warning badge.sudoreplay -d /var/log/sudoreplay <TSID>.
client cert — unknown shippers are rejected before any data is exchanged.host field in SESSION_START — a compromised shipper on host A cannot forge logs for host B.ed25519 private key — never distributed to clients.public key (ack-verify.key): can verify but cannot forge.cgroup.freeze=1 is enough.app-*.scope
— outside our cgroup. No controlling TTY →
shipper sends SIGSTOP directly (freeze, not kill).
On resume: SIGCONT.
1 to cgroup.freeze — kernel suspends all tasks. GUI apps outside the cgroup receive SIGSTOP. Banner shown on /dev/tty.Ctrl+C / Ctrl+Z still work — monitor thread reclaims terminal foreground group every 150 ms.cgroup.freeze=0, SIGCONT to any SIGSTOP'd processes. Session resumes with no data loss.
A self-contained HTTP server reads the same iolog directories
as sudoreplay
and serves a full terminal player — no database, no dependencies.